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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J E F F SHIPLEY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
C & W CONTRACTING COMPANY 
and T H E TRAVELER'S 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
13639 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF T H E CASE 
This is a review of the proceedings before the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah culminating in an order by 
the Commission awarding the Plaintiff a permanent 
partial disability of 50 percent. 
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t Vt * • STATEMENT OF FACTS 
''
 n
 * A N D DISPOSITION BELOW " 
• -
1
 The Plaintiff was employed by C & W Contracting 
Company on October 27,1969 at which time he suffered 
a severe injury when a road grader fell off a set of jacks 
onto the Plaintiff who was lying underneath it attempt-
ing to repair the same (R. 80, 84). The Plaintiff suf-
fered a fracture of the pelvis, i.e. the left iliac wing, a 
severe compression fracture of the entire fifth lumbar 
vertebrae, a remote fracture of L 2 and miscellaneous 
abbrasions and contusions (R. 7, 127). The Plaintiff 
was initially hospitalized for thirty days (R. 5) and had 
numerous hospitalizations thereafter. On the 18th day of 
May, 1971, a surgical fusion was attempted of the L 4-
L 5 and sacrum by Dr. Ward B. Studt, the orthopedic 
surgeon treating the Plaintiff from Grand Junction, 
Colorado. The fusion was not succesful in that the ver-
tebral bodies failed to fuse (R. 131). Plaintiff has 
continued to have numbness in his left leg, pain while 
working, walking or standing, with the worst pain 
occurring when sitting or riding in a car. He has diffi-
culty sleeping and wears a back brace. H e uses a cane 
except when he is in his home (R. 125, 195). 
The Plaintiff's treating doctors, Dr. J . P . Muncey 
and Dr. W. B. Studt, both concluded that the Plaintiff 
is unemployable in any employment (R. 21, 174). 
:
 The Defendants conceded that the accident of Oc-
tober 27, 1969 was an industrial accident for which the 
Defendants were liable (R. 80). The Defendants, how-
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ever, did not concede the extent of their liability. A hear-
ing was held on July 12,1972 at which time evidence was 
received from the Plaintiff. Subsequently a medical 
panel was presented a series of questions concerning the 
Plaintiff. In regard to permanent disability, the panel 
was only asked to evaluate what Plaintiff's permanent 
partial disability was, no mention being made of per-
manent total disability (R. 116). On January 30, 1973, 
the panel report was filed in which the panel found that 
the Plaintiff had numbness in his left leg, pain in work-
ing, walking, and standing, with the worst pain occur-
ring when sitting or riding in a car. They found that he 
had difficulty in sleeping and that he wore a back brace 
and used a cane. They found that the Plaintiff had suf-
fered fractures of the right tranverse process of L 1, 2, 
3 and 4, a significant fracture at L 5, severe arthritic 
changes in all areas of the back, a minor injury to T 9 
and a compression fracture to T 10. The fusion which 
had previously been performed at L 4 L 5 was found to 
have not fused. They found that his forward bending 
was only 50 percent of normal and that other motions of 
the lumbar spine were 30 percent of normal. Plaintiff 
lacked touching the floor by 10 inches upon forward 
bending. Slight hypesthesia of the left foot was found 
and a 10 percent loss in dorsiflexion power of the left 
foot. Pain was found in the left side of the pelvis as a 
result of the forced motion of the right hip. Pain was 
noted in the low thoracic area and greater pain at the 
area of the attempted fusion. Other miscellaneous find-
ings were noted in the report. The panel noted that th§ 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fracture to L 5 was a severe crushing of the vertebrae. 
The panel concluded that the Plaintiff had a 50 percent 
permanent partial disability of his body as a whole as a 
proximate result of his accident of October 27, 1969. No 
contributing conditions were found to exist although a 
peripheral vascular disease was found to be in a con-
comitant status. The panel found that the extensive pain 
medication being taken by the Plaintiff was solely a re-
sult of the accident of October 27, 1969. The panel sug-
gested that no further surgery would be of benefit (R. 
124-132). ••'-. •< ?}.>;• - ,,.. „ y 
Plaintiff objected to the report insofar as it may be 
treated as a determination of permanent disability, but 
agreed that the report could be received as a finding by 
the panel as to the physical impairment only of the 
Plaintiff. Subsequently, a request was filed by the 
Plaintiff for a disability rating of the Plaintiff and ac-
cordingly it was agreed by all parties at a Pretrial that 
the Plaintiff would be examined by the Department of 
Employment Security and the Department of Rehabili-
tation Services. Plaintiff was then interviewed and eval-
uated by those two state agencies and a hearing was held 
on September 12,1973. At that hearing Plaintiff called 
as witnesses Dr. Ward B. Studt who testified that his 
prior disability rating of 20 percent was given in the con-
text of the Colorado practice, that is that in Colorado a 
17 percent permanent disability is in fact a permanent 
total disability. He also stated his opinion that the Plain-
tiff was unemployable. (R. 174) Carl F . Craync, a 
counselor supervisor for the Division of Rehabilitation 
4 
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Services of the State of Utah was called as the next wit-
ness. H e testified that after interviewing the Plaintiff 
and reviewing the pertinent medical records and occu-
pational files that the Plaintiff was unemployable in any 
conceivable occupation, (R. 180) and that Shipley 
would work if he could. (R. 181) Lynn Greenwood, a 
vocational counselor for the Utah Department of Em-
ployment Security testified that from his interview and 
investigation it was his opinion that Plaintiff was un-
employable in any conceivable occupation. (R. 186) 
Roth Crayne and Greenwood based their opinions upon 
the following: 
(a) Plaintiff's pain and limited mobility. 
(b) The Plaintiff's inability to ambulate and 
change positions without help. 
(c) The Plaintiff's inability to remain in one po-
sition for more than a short period of time; 
(d) His 7th Grade education; 
(e) His limited work ability; 
(f) His age; and 
(g) His economic impracticability of retraining 
himself. 
The Plaintiff and his wife, Ina Ray Shipley, were 
then called as witnesses to testify concerning his condi-
tion. The Defendant called no witnesses and offered no 
independent evidence. 
On November 30, 1973, the hearing examiner, 
Richard G. Sumsion, entered his Findings of Fact, Con-
5 
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elusions of Law and Interim Order, the material conclu-
sions of which are as follows: That the Plaintiffs over-
all condition of unemployability was substantially con-
tributed to by his industrial accident, but that the in-
dustrial accident was not of such significance as to im-
pose liability upon the insurance carrier for permanent 
and total disability and accordingly found that the 
Plaintiff was entitled to 50 percent permanent partial 
disability benefits. The hearing examiner also found 
that the Defendants were obligated only to pay 50 per-
cent of future medical expenses. Plaintiff timely filed a 
Motion for Review of the hearing examiner's Order and 
on February 21, 1974 the Industrial Commission en-
tered an Amended Order affirming the hearing exam-
iner's finding as to 50 percent permanent partial dis-
ability, but reversed the hearing examiner's Order that 
the Defendants pay only 50 percent of the medications 
and ordered that the Defendants were liable for the pay-
ment of all future medication expenses as well as af-
firming the prior Order of the Defendants' liability to 
pay all medical expenses, past and future. 
• * • • ' . , ! . • • " ' • • • • - - ' ' ' - • 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiff appeals from the Amended Order where-
in it affirms the Order of the hearing examiner that the 
Plaintiff was entitled to benefits of a 50 percent per-
manent partial disability. 
6 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
T H E INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S F I N D -
I N G T H A T T H E P L A I N T I F F ' S D I S A B I L I T Y 
I S M E R E L Y 50 P E R C E N T A N D NOT A TO-
T A L P E R M A N E N T D I S A B I L I T Y I S NOT 
S U P P O R T E D BY T H E E V I D E N C E A N D I S 
CONTRARY TO L A W , T H E COMMISSION 
ACTING I N EXCESS OF I T S P O W E R S . 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order of the hearing examiner and the Commission were 
based on evidence presented by the Plaintiff. At no time 
did the Defendants present any evidence that the Plain-
tiff was employable. There simply was no dispute in the 
evidence as to Plaintiff's inability to be employed in any 
occupation. 
The hearing examiner and the Commission, how-
ever, applied erroneous law to the undisputed facts in 
concluding that Plaintiff was not permanently disabled. 
The law in the State of Utah defines "permanent total 
disability" as not being limited to physical impairment. 
35-1-67 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, plain-
ly speaks of "total disability" as affecting the applicant's 
ability to perform any work with which to support him-
self and his dependents. The statute recognizes that in 
each case the effect of a physical injury or illness will 
differ according to the abilities of the applicant, and 
does not require a construction of the statute whereby a 
certain physical impairment is necessary. In Spring 
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Canyon Coal Company vs. Industrial Commission, 74 
Utah 103, 277 P . 206, the Court defined "permanent 
and total disability" as being the applicant's incapability 
of performing remunerative employment. In regard to 
his burden to prove that, the Court said that the appli-
cant was not required to show that he was incapacitated 
from performing any and all kinds of work. He must, 
however, show that he has made an effort to procure the 
employment which he is able to perform assuming there 
are duties which he can perform without pain or suffer-
ing, or without unduly endangering his health, life or 
limb. This rule was followed in the cases of United Park 
City Mines Company vs. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 
P.2d 800 (1964) and in Morrison Knudsen Construc-
tion Company vs. Industrial Commission, 18 Utah 2d 
390, 424 P.2d 138. In the Park City case, the Court held 
that a 90 percent loss of bodily function and a certifica-
tion by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation that 
the applicant was not subject to rehabilitation consti-
tuted a total and permanent disablement. In Morrison 
Knudsen, the physical impairment was 70 percent ac-
companied by factors which made the applicant unable 
to engage in gainful employment, to wit: Low I.Q., age, 
limited job skills and a finding by the Vocational Re-
habilitation Department that he could not be rehabili-
tated. A finding of permanent total disability was af-
firmed. These cases are consistent with the general rule, 
known as the "odd-lot" doctrine. This doctrine is ex-
plained in 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law 
Sec. 5750 P . 83 as follows: 
8 
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"Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted 
in virtually every jurisdiction, total disability 
may be found in the case of workers who, while 
not altogether incapacitated for work, are so 
handicapped that they will not be employed reg-
ularly in any well-known branch of the labor 
market. The essence of the test is the probable 
dependability with which claimant can sell his 
services in a competitive market, undistorted by 
such factors as business booms, sympathy of a 
particular employer or friends, temporary good 
luck, or the subhuman efforts of the claimant to 
rise above his crippling handicaps." 
Defendants never presented any evidence that the 
Plaintiff is employable in any conceivable job or occu-
pation. The Plaintiff went to extensive efforts to bring 
forth all of the relevant evidence pertaining to that issue. 
Both treating doctors, Dr. Ward B. Studt and Dr. J . P . 
Muncey, rendered their opinion that he was not employ-
able. Carl F . Craync, counselor and supervisor for the 
Utah Division of Rehabilitation Services found that 
Plaintiff could not perform any gainful employment 
and that he would if he could. Lynn Greenwood, a vo-
cational counselor for the Utah Department of Employ-
ment Security, found Plaintiff unemployable in any 
conceivable occupation. All of these opinions were based 
upon the physical impairment which the Plaintiff had 
received, especially the pain and limitation resulting in 
his inability to set, stand, or drive a vehicle for more than 
a short period of time coupled with his age, lack of edu-
cation and lack of job skills. None of the doctors exam-
ining the Plaintiff, either on the medical panel or at the 
9 
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behest of the Defendants have ever stated that the Plain-
tiff was employable. There being absolutely no evidence 
of his employability, that fact must be deemed proved by 
the Plaintiff. Especially is this true where the opinion 
of the Department of Rehabilitation which by statute is 
given the responsibility of determining employability 
and ability to be rehabilitated, reported unequivocally on 
two separate occasions that the Plaintiff was unemploy-
able in any gainful occupation as a result of the indus-
trial accident. (R. 115, 180) 
A close examination of the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order entered by the hearing ex-
aminer discloses thatgross errors were made on Pages 4 
and 5 in comparing the present case with the fact situa-
tion in Caillet vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 90 
Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760. The hearing examiner drew the 
conclusion that the injury to Mr. Caillet was more severe 
than the injury to Mr. Shipley. That may or may not be 
true. However, that is not the point. The reason the 
Plaintiff cited the Caillett case was for its legal holding 
which was initially recognized by the hearing examiner: 
"Where the evidence conclusively shows that the 
employee is permanently and totally disabled 
from either securing or performing work of the 
general character that he was performing when 
injured, he by such evidence establishes a prima 
facie case, and in the absence of any showing that 
he is able to secure and perform work of a special 
nature not generally available, he is, as a matter 
of law, entitled to an award as and for permanent 
total disability." 
10 
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Having cited that as the true test, the hearing examiner 
then completely ignores it. In his Conclusions of Law 
stated on Page 5, he states as follows: 
" . . . I t is the opinion of the hearing examiner that 
the applicant's overall condition of unemploy-
ability was substantially contributed to by his in-
dustrial accident, but that the industrial accident 
was not of such significance as to impose liability 
upon the insurance carrier for permanent and 
total disability . . . " 
The hearing examiner found that the Plaintiff was un-
employable and totally disabled, and that the condition 
was substantially contributed to by the industrial acci-
dent. H e then draws a conclusion that is not supported 
by the law of the State of Utah or any other jurisdiction 
in that he concludes that the Defendants can only be held 
liable for the physical impairment that they caused and 
not the contributing factors which result in total dis-
ability. Such a conclusion results in gross injustice to the 
workmen under the Workman's Compensation and runs 
counter to the letter and spirit of the Workman's Com-
pensation Law. By this principle, if it were law, total 
disability liability would rarely or never occur. The 
statement of the examiner that " . . . the industrial acci-
dent was not of such significance as to impose liability 
. . ." is a conclusion which the law does not allow. Testi-
mony at both hearings held in this case and the medical 
reports received all state that the unemployability of the 
Plaintiff directly resulted from the industrial accident. 
No where is there any evidence in the record that a cause 
11 
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other than the accident precipitated the unemployability. 
What the hearing examiner apparently meant to do was 
arbitrarily limit the Defendant's liability to merely the 
proportion of disability arising from the physical impair-
ment and to not assess the remaining impairment that 
arose in conjunction with the physical impairment by 
reason of age, pain, lack of ability to sit, lack of employ-
ment and lack of skill. If that were the law, the only time 
a person would be permanently disabled under the 
Workmen's Compensation Law would be when he was 
100 percent physically disabled. I t is clear from the stat-
ute and cases cited that the hearing examiner and the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making 
what appears to be a compromise not permitted by law 
and the undisputed facts here. The Plaintiff clearly 
established his prima facie case in the manner required 
in Caillett vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, and 
the burden, therefore, fell upon the Defendants to prove 
the Plaintiff's employability. The Defendant did not 
even attempt to prove that fact. The medical panel 
found that the 50 percent physical impairment was a 
direct result of the industrial accident and found that 
there were no other contributing physical conditions. 
Therefore, Plaintiff submits that the finding of 50 per-
cent permanent partial disability and its affirmance by 
the Industrial Commission was not supported by the 
facts, and that the application of law was erroneous and 
beyond the Commission's powers. Accordingly the said 
findings should be reversed and an Order entered di-
recting the Industrial Commission to enter an Order 
12 
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finding the Plaintiff totally and permanently disabled 
as a result of the industrial accident of October 27,1969, 
and ordering benefits in accordance therewith. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of May, 1974. 
M O Y L E & D R A P E R 
By W. B R E N T W I L C O X 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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